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Transhumanism maintains that technology will allow humans to de -
velop beyond all known limits. This essay maintains that this entails
both an epistemology and an anthropology that are inherently incon-
sistent. As an allegedly experience based ideology employing concepts
traditionally reserved for the divine and the metaphysical, transhuma-
nism therefore does not make sense.
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The Problem of Transhumanism
Modern technology has been veryimportant – and quite success -ful – in giving us longer and
heal thier lives. Does this development have
any limit? Should modern biotechnology
aim at curing human illness to the extent
that illness and decease become things of
the past, or should the goals be set at a
more modest level? Is there a point where
the losses outweigh the gains, and if there
is, where is that point?
Defending the view that this develop-
ment neither has nor should have any
limit is the ideology which by its own
adherents is called transhumanism. Trans -
 humanists maintain that science and tech-
nology will enable humans to develop
beyond all limits presently known, pos-
sibly to the extent that we will see the
immortal human with intellectual and
emotional capacities that vastly oversha-
dow what is known today. According to
this way of thinking, we will therefore in
the foreseeable future see the develop-
ment of the human being, version 2.0. On
what is this claim built, and can it be
developed and maintained in a way that
is consistent and free from internal con-
tradictions? According to transhuma-
nism, science is supposed to build a new
entity that in all respect surpasses what
today is considered typically human. But
how do we actually evaluate the goodness
and desirability of this process when the
alteration of the point of reference, the
human subject, is the very point of what
is going on? How can concepts like
”improvement” and ”betterment” make
sense when there is no stable point of
reference? And how is the goal of impro-
ving the human subject related to the idea
of human equality? Is awareness of these
problems a part of the transhumanist
ideology, and if it is, do transhumanists
offer us a viable solution? These are the
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questions that will be addressed in this
essay.
The Transhumanist Ideology
As an organised movement transhuma-
nism does not have a long history.1 In
1998, representatives from the relevant
sciences formed the World Trans huma -
nist Association, which has evolved into
what today is called Humanity+ and
describes itself as ”dedicated to elevating
the human condition”.2 According to its
adherents, however, the roots of the
movement are to be found in the develop-
ment of modern science. In particular, one
emphasizes the significance of Francis
Bacon and his Novum Organum from
1620, where he defines ”the achievement
of mastery over nature in order to impro-
ve the condition of human beings” as the
goal of ”scientific methodology based on
empirical investigation”.3 Transhuma -
nism thus understands all proper science
as empirical science and presents itself as
a movement for promoting the fulfilment
of its inherent goals.
The word ”transhumanism” seems to
have been coined by Julian Huxley in
1957; he was thinking along the lines of a
future projection of evolutionary deve-
lopment more or less in the same way as
Teilhard de Chardin.4 Present-day trans-
humanists are, however, more intent on
using recent technological developments
actively in enhancing the human predica-
ment. The goal of this development is
referred to as the posthuman, which is
defined in the following way: Post hu -
mans will  
reach intellectual heights as far
above any current human genius as
humans are above other primates,
... be resistant to disease and imper-
vious to aging, ... have unlimited
youth and vigor, ... exercise control
over their own desires, moods, and
mental states, ... be able to avoid
feeling tired, hateful, or irritated
about petty things, ... have an in -
creased capacity for pleasure, love,
artistic appreciation, and serenity,
... [and] experience novel states of
consciousness that current human
brains cannot access.5
Transhumanists maintain that this goal
will be achieved through ”completely
syn thetic artificial intelligences,” through
”enhanced uploads”, which is defined as
the transfer of ”an intellect from a biolo-
gical brain to a computer” or it ”could be
the result of making many smaller but
cumulatively profound augmentations to
a biological human.”6 Any way, this will
according to many transhumanists even-
tually lead to what they refer to as the sin-
gularity, which is the moment when
humanity will pass from the transhuma-
nist hope to the reality of the posthuman
future.7 What by many transhumanists is
considered as the ultimate goal of science,
the restructuring of the universe as one
connected network of information pro-
cessing, will then be close at hand.8 After
the singularity, we will have a situation
where ”the rate of technological develop-
ment becomes so rapid that the progress-
curve becomes nearly vertical”; this will
transcend the world with which we are
familiar to the extent that it may be
”impossible ... for us to predict what
comes after the singularity.”9
Not all transhumanists believe in the
singularity. Common for all transhuma-
nists is, however, the insistence that hu -
mans should develop by overcoming their
biological limitations.10 A central element
in the transhumanist ideology is therefore
the understanding of embodiment as an
impediment to the development of the fu -
ture human. Embodied categories like sex
and gender are therefore aspects of the
human nature that will be left behind.11
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The link between sex and reproduction
has to be severed and the production of
future intelligent beings will be entrusted
to technology for the sake of maintaining
the necessary quality control. The pleasu-
re of sexual experience should therefore
be completely free from any association
with reproduction and the idea of a bio-
logical sexual identity. Technologically 
in du ced sex reassignment and the experi-
ence of upload or virtual sex are therefo-
re considered as undisputed goods, and
while we wait for the ultimate freedom
from sexual reproduction, health authori-
ties should promote the use of ”contra-
ception, abortion, and genetic therapies
so that parents can make free and infor-
med reproductive decisions that result in
fewer disabilities in the next generation.”
Transhumanists therefore think that
society has an obligation ”to subsidize the
birth of healthy children.”12
The development of the cyborg, i.e.,
the man-machine hybrid, which suppo-
sedly will lack any kind of gendered
struc ture, is therefore considered as an
important step in the right direction,
paving the way for freedom from all
kinds of oppression associated with natu-
re and embodiment;13 it will give us the
definite liberation from all kinds of so-
called Enlightenment gender essentia-
lism.14 We are not there yet, but transhu-
manists see the use of ”prostheses, plastic
surgery, intensive use of telecommunica-
tions, ... androgyny, mediated reproduc-
tion (such as in vitro fertilization), absence
of religious beliefs, and a rejection of tra-
ditional family values” as signs that we
are on the right track.15
Transhumanists are aware that such
rather invasive applications of technology
raises questions of its possible misuse,
and may refer to the famous 1932 novel
of Julian Huxley’s brother Aldous, Brave
New World, as an example of what might
happen if technology is used to ”diminish
the scope of human nature rather than
enhance it”.16 For this reason, they do not
support all the efforts of their predeces-
sors. In the first half of the 20th century,
the idea of a scientific enhancement of the
human nature was a central element in the
ideology of the so-called eugenics move-
ment.17 Transhumanists are critical to the
way eugenics was applied in the service of
Nazi and Communist18 totalitarianisms,
but not necessarily to eugenics in itself as
long as the decision of its application is
left to the individual. Transhumanists there-
fore maintain a suspicion ”of collectively
orchestrated change” and a preference for
”the right of the individuals to redesign
themselves and their own descendants.”19
What is wrong when decided by the state
might thus be right as the outcome of
individual choice. 
In this way, transhumanists try to stri-
ke the right balance between the kind of
liberalism on which scientific innovation
depends and the kind of collectivism large
scale scientific cooperation presupposes.
It does not seem to be a central question,
though, and they may to some extent
disagree among themselves on how the
right balance is to be found.20 One thus
gets the impression that the problematic
aspects of these issues tend to be oversha-
dowed by a general optimism concerning
the possibility of science itself to solve
even the problem of the possible misuse
of science. Issues concerning the possible
impact of technology on society is there-
fore hardly addressed beyond a general
agreement that one at least should avoid
outright coercion, and the closely related
question of how enhanced technology
may affect the relation between rich and
poor is usually not even asked.21
Transhumanism is ”defined by its
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commitment to shaping fundamentally
bet ter futures.”1 The ultimate goal be longs,
however, to a kind of reality that is un -
knowable to humans as living today; we
may have an idea of the direction where
we want to go and the means that will
bring us there, but we don’t know either
when we will arrive or what to expect
when we – or our enhanced descendants
or clones – arrive apart from the fact that
it is supposed to be better than anything
experienced by humans so far. This belief
in scientific progress is quite strong, so
strong in fact that the possibly problemat-
ic aspects of a development along these
lines may not always be taken quite serio-
usly.
Does Transhumanism Make Sense?
The basic ideological commitments of
transhumanism are fairly clear even from
a short overview like this. The movement
is, as already indicated by its name, clear-
ly anthropocentric and committed to the
betterment of the human predicament.
Transhumanism is thus not particularly
worried about ecological concerns, but
sees even these as problems that eventual-
ly and necessarily will be solved by tech-
nological improvements to the satisfac-
tion of all humans.
Not all parts of human nature as
known today are equally interesting,
though. Transhumanism is committed to
the improvement of the human experience
of the world, and this commitment is
developed according to a world-view that
seems to be strictly dualist. Physical nature
seems to be interesting mainly as a tool
for the enhancement of human experience.
It thus seems to lack an inherent value
beyond its usability as raw material for
technological manipulation supposedly
improving the human predicament, which
then again is defined with exclusive refe-
rence to the cognitive and emotional
aspects of the human being. The dualism
thus extends to transhumanist anthropo-
logy; even the human body is dispensable
as long as the possibility of pleasure and
knowledge is maintained. The only phe-
nomenon which has any value on its own
seems to be human consciousness.
To this is added a strongly emphasized
epistemological optimism. According to
transhumanism, the world is essentially
knowable. Combined with the understan-
ding of the material aspects of the world
as essentially dispensable, this leads to
what may be described as a kind of spiri-
tual reductionism: All there is, is redu-
cible to ideal or mathematical structures,
the ultimate knowledge of which is, or
will be, accessible to human conscious-
ness. The goal and, at least according to
some versions of transhumanism, the
necessary outcome of scientific progress is
the ability to manipulate these structures
to the extent that the human experience
of happiness and satisfaction is, or will
be, endlessly improvable. Provided that
the opposition from what the transhuma-
nists call the bioconservatives, or, on a
mo re polemical note, the luddites23, is a
prob lem that can be solved – and why
shouldn’t this be a technologically sol-
vable problem if all others are? – this will
be the consummation of the development
of the human.
Strictly anthropocentric, strictly dua -
list in the sense that the material is mere-
ly instrumental,24 and committed to
unbridled epistemological optimism; this,
then, seem to be the main characteristics
of the transhumanist world view. As such,
it is not without philosophical antece-
dents; it still differs from these, though, in
ways that lets one wonder whether trans-
humanism is, in fact, consistent on its
own terms. The mathematical reductio-
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nism suggests that transhumanism could
be considered as kind of Platonic idea-
lism. Platonism is, however, as a historical
movement neither one-sidedly anthropo-
centric nor epistemologically optimist,
but considers the ultimate realities of the
world to be beyond the realm of human
creativity and for that reason essentially
unknown.25 Closer to the emphases of
transhumanism are therefore the philo-
sophical reflections on the mathematical
reductionism of modern science, i.e., the
philosophies of Descartes and Kant.26 And
both are indeed both anthropocentric,
dualist and epistemologically optimist in
ways that seem to anticipate these central
tenets of transhumanism.27 In particular,
the Cartesian ”cogito, ergo sum” with its
inherent dualism between the thinkable
and the merely material seems to antici-
pate a typically transhumanist emphasis,
intent as it is to make the entire universe
into an instrument of human intelligence.
However, neither Descartes nor Kant
combines anthropocentrism and episte-
mological optimism the way the transhu-
manists do; on the contrary, both find
that one-sided anthropocentrism entails
epistemological solipsism and thus scepti-
cism. To maintain the idea of truth as a
universal category – and without it, even
transhumanism cannot be true in any
meaningful sense of the word – human
communication must therefore be thought
to move within a structure beyond the
merely human. Descartes tries to solve
this problem by adding to the undispu-
table fact of his own consciousness the
existence of God as the guarantor of the
correspondence between his own intelli-
gence and the non-thinking world,28
while Kant’s attempt implies the non-
knowability of the world apart from the
structures imposed on it through the
common features of human rationality.29
Neither solution works for transhuma-
nism, though. Obviously, God is not an
observable entity according to the trans-
humanist understanding of ”scientific
methodology based on empirical investi-
gation”; Descartes’s appeal to theology
for the tenability of his epistemological
optimism therefore has no traction with
transhumanism. Kant’s solution may fare
somewhat better, and the Transhumanist
FAQ refers to him as a predecessor. How -
ever, transhumanist epistemological opti-
mism still seems to presuppose some kind
of direct epistemological access to the
world; if the world in itself remains essen-
tially unknown as Kant maintains, the
idea that it can be endlessly manipulated
to the satisfaction of the human seems to
lack a sufficiently stable foundation. 
To this is added the complication the
core doctrine of transhumanism, the mal-
leability of the human subject, adds to
Kantian epistemology. If the goal of the
scientific endeavour is a new human be -
ing that in all aspects of its being vastly
transcends the human as known today,
how can we be sure that the modes of
perception and categories of understan-
ding as known today still apply? Is it even
thinkable that they should? And if they
don’t, Kant’s argument for epistemologi-
cal reliability is lost, and the belief in sci-
ence is reduced to an unfounded conten-
tion.
The problem highlighted by this dis-
cussion is that epistemological optimism,
i.e., the belief that our understanding of
the world is essentially reliable, presup -
poses an understanding of truth and
rationality that can hardly be defined by
reference to human experience alone.
Both Plato (though not an epistemologi-
cal optimist in the sense defined here),
Descartes, Kant and transhumanism pre -
suppose the universality of truth, i.e., they
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think that if something is true, it is true in
all cases where the relevant conditions
apply. Which means that the concept of
truth, without which epistemological opti -
mism hardly makes sense, is a metaphysi-
cal concept that according to Descartes
(and arguably even according to Plato)
presupposes a theology or according to
Kant an understanding of human rationa-
lity as a universal and timeless phenome-
non. But universal and timeless phenome-
na do not sit well with transhumanism;
such a phenomenon is arguably incompa-
tible both with transhumanist empiricism
and its insistence of the development of
the epistemological subject, i.e., the hu -
man, beyond any limits know to us today.
The transhumanist understanding of
true knowledge of the world as ultimate-
ly accessible through human experience
in a way that eventually will lead to a pro -
 found alteration of that experience thus
seems to build on incompatible anthropo-
logical and epistemological assumptions.
The very ideas of ”elevating the human
condition” and ”enhancing the human
predicament” presuppose a stability of
the human standards of measure that to
the extent that the transhumanist project
”succeeds” no longer apply. And transhu-
manist philosophy does not seem to have
any argumentative strategy for solving
this contradiction; on the contrary, it on
the whole behaves as if it does not exist.
Also with regard to its spirit/matter-
dualism, transhumanism is informed by
essential aspects of modernity from which
it draws seemingly inconsistent implica-
tions. The modern idea of ontological
dualism originates in late medieval Scho -
las ticism and became the dominating
worldview of the Western world, at least
as far as politics and science are concer-
ned, through the Enlightenment.30
Neither Platonism nor Christianity, the
main intellectual forces of the premodern
Western world, are dualist in the late
medieval and modern sense; both pre -
suppose the presence of the eternal within
the context of the material in ways that
let the differentiation between the two
remain an unsolvable riddle.31 Episte mo -
logical optimism is, however, essentially
linked to the ”divide et impera”-attitude
of modernity’s dualist reductionism; one
declares one’s ability to grasp the inner
essence of the world by seeing either sub-
stance, the material or the spiritual, as the
expression of the other. Ontological ma -
te rialist reductionism is, however, argu-
ably a contradiction, as it seems to imply
the belief that there are no beliefs.32 This
obviously differs from the transhumanist
belief in the betterment of the human con -
dition, and transhumanists are aware of
the difference.33 The manipulation of the
material by means of intelligence that is
presupposed in the transhumanist em -
phasis on artificial intelligence and the
possibility of uploading of brain content
to other media hardly makes sense on
strictly materialist presuppositions. 
Still, the question remains if the world
in this way is reducible to the duality of
disembodied consciousness and merely
func tionalist materiality without any es -
sen tial aspect of it being lost. Is it possible
to give an experience-based answer to
that question when a world inhabited (or
governed?) by intelligences whose materi-
al representation is purely accidental is
something nobody has ever experienced?
Can transhumanism’s kind of spiritual
reductionism be said to be based on empi-
rical science when there are no empirical
data whatsoever from a world where the
link between intelligence and the body
has been severed?
As counter-strategies to these objec-
tions transhumanists may want to adjust
their position to the extent that one no
longer insists either on the dissolution of
embodiment or on the ultimate knowabi-
lity of the world. Transhumanism would
then, however, be reduced to the hope of
scientific progress for the sake of humans
continuing to have longer and healthier
lives, which hardly is a controversial point
of view. Transhumanism as an orga nized
movement with an agenda would then
hardly make sense any more.
These reflections seem to warrant the
conclusion that transhumanist epistemo-
logy cannot be upheld on close inspec-
tion. What, then, about its anthropology?
Transhumanism and the Problem of
Human Equality
Transhumanists are in theory committed
to the principle of human equality; accor-
ding to the Transhumanist FAQ they even
want to extent ”formal legal equality and
liberty into economic and cultural liberty
and equality.” Can this claim be maintain -
ed on transhumanist assumptions?  Trans -
humanism is above all committed to the
principle of experience-based scientific
exploration. The understanding of cut-
ting edge technology which is thereby
achieved is, however, not something that
is evenly distributed among humans. In
an ideal world, they who know would
use their knowledge for the benefit of
those who don’t, but this ideal world is
definitely beyond the realm of experien-
ced reality. We have no data to support
the idea that knowledge of how to enhan-
ce the human predicament will equally
benefit those who know and those who
don’t; all observable facts show that
”what we call Man’s power over Nature
turns out to be a power exercised by some
men over other men with Nature as its
instrument”.34 Historically, the relation
between scientific development and the
welfare of humanity has therefore been
ambivalent at best; enhanced technolo-
gies have both improved life conditions
and led to suffering through war, subju-
gation and slavery. And transhumanists
have not given us any compelling reason
to think this ambivalence will disappear
just by technology becoming more ambi-
tious and invasive.
This tendency for knowledge to dee-
pen inequalities rather than conquering
them is arguably exacerbated by transhu-
manism’s tendency to extend its anthro-
pocentrism even to its moral philosophy;
according to transhumanist epistemology,
there is no such thing as a moral norm
which all humans are obliged to obey. For
transhumanists, there exists nothing
beyond the possibility of increased know-
ledge and the obligation to make that
possibility into a reality.35 If the outcome
of this process is compatible with the idea
of human equality, this compatibility
must therefore, on transhumanist assump -
tions, be built into the scientifically explo-
rable structures of the world. The idea of
human equality can thus only be accepted
to the extent that it manifests itself as a
result of scientific development, the out-
come of which, however, is completely
unknown. The transhumanist commit-
ment to the principle of human equality
thus looks shaky at best; its relation to the
basic epistemological commitments of the
movement is neither explored nor ex -
plain ed.
Nazism is probably the most extreme
example of an ideology that in the name
of science explicitly dispensed with the
idea of human equality. It is therefore
hardly a coincidence that the critique of
the possible implications of modern scien-
tism in this respect has been particularly
strong in Germany. Based on his research
into what he saw as parallels between
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ancient Gnosticism and the modern infa-
tuation with technology, the German phi-
losopher Hans Jonas in 1979 published a
book where he defended what he called
the imperative of responsibility. Gnosti -
cism established a strict distinction bet-
ween those who knew and those who did
not, and found, in a way that according
to Jonas parallels similar phenomena in
modern Nazi and Communist totalitarian
systems, that the latter existed for the
bene fit of the former. To avoid this dang-
er, and since we never know where the
scientific endeavour may take us, the only
responsible option is according to Jonas
to always think according to the worst
possible implications of our actions.36 He
therefore suggests the following modifica-
tion of Kant’s categorical imperative: ”Act
so that the effects of your action are com-
patible with the permanence of ge nuine
human life”,37 which for Jonas essentially
is human life as known to us today. The
very idea of a development of the essenti-
ally human is therefore in Jonas’s view
incompatible with the idea of human
equa lity.
Essentially following in the footsteps
of Jonas, but aiming his critique more
specifically at the problem of artificial
reproduction, is Jürgen Habermas.38 For
Habermas, artifical reproduction techno-
logy and the principle of human equality
are incompatible notions. The idea of
”liberal eugenics regulated by supply and
demand”39 he considers as a contradic-
tion; as he sees it, one simply cannot men-
tion eugenics and liberalism in the same
con text. For Habermas, liberalism is
foun ded on the principle of equal oppor-
tunity and is therefore incompatible with
making decisions on behalf of future
gene rations as implied in genetic enginee-
ring.40 Human dignity can only be upheld
through the maintenance of reciprocity in
all morally relevant discussions;41 modern
biotechnology thus threatens the idea of
human equality as understood in classical
liberal thought by nullifying the possibili-
ty of informed consent as far as the futu-
re generations is concerned.
In the works of Francis Fukuyama, a
similar approach is broadened to a gene-
ral and explicit critique of the transhuma-
nist movement.42 In his well-known work
The End of History and the Last Man
(1992) he argues that liberal democracy
and Western market economy represent
the best possible models for human socie-
ties; with the end of the Cold War, the
time of battles between competing ideolo-
gies is over. The problem that now con -
fronts us is the problem of controlling
technology. Transhumanism is therefore
in his view the one outcome of the liberal
democracy that may contain the seeds of
its undoing. In his book Our Posthuman
Future: Consequences of the Biotech no -
logy Revolution from 2002 Fukuyama
therefore argues that biotechnology
endangers the liberal project by possibly
introducing alterations of the human
nature that entails new forms of inequali-
ty.43 In the long run, the victory of liberal
democracy is therefore according to
Fukuyama dependent on the end of scien-
ce and technology as known today. Far
from supporting the transhumanist vi sion,
both Jonas, Habermas and Fukuyama
come to the opposite conclusion: There is
probably nothing today that endangers
the liberal idea of human dignity and
equality in quite the same way as the
transhumanist idea of technological
human enhancement.
The transhumanists’ rejection of Fuku -
yama’s critique is explicitly founded on
the view that there is no human essence;
we are therefore free to go where techno-
logy takes us.44 The problem is, however,
that technology ultimately make take us
to where to human point of view hardly
matters any more. If the human predica-
ment is enhanced by disembodied intelli-
gence, for whom is this future supposed
to be better? For humans or for their pre-
sumably vastly more intelligent creations?
And if superintelligent machines actually
find humans to be an impediment for the
realization of what they find most useful,
and act on that conviction, in what sense
are we still speaking of progress?45 If that
situation should ever occur, the critics of
both scientism and transhumanism will
finally and undisputably be proved right;
the world and what we make of it are
ultimately not controllable after all.
There may, however, be none of the critics
left to savour the victory.46
Transhumanism as Inconsistent
Religiosity
Transhumanism believes in a vision of the
future human as endowed with characte-
ristics that during most of the history of
the human has been considered as predi-
cates of the divine: Omniscience, perfect
happiness, possibly even eternal life. It
thus essentially presents itself as scientism
with an eschatology. The attraction of
trans humanism is presumably this promi-
se of divinity from within the context of
the merely immanent. The basic problem
of transhumanism is the question wheth -
er it makes sense to establish predicates of
the divine based on an empiricist episte-
mology.
The monotheist religions agree that the
answer to this question is no. They there-
fore unanimously maintain that the divi-
ne predicates have to be established with
reference to a revelation that lets humans
participate in a reality beyond the hu -
manly knowable. Transhumanists replace
revelation with scientific research foun-
ded on a purely empiricist methodology,
but still maintain the divine predicates.
This combination of an immanent episte-
mology with a theological anthropology
represents what has been called an imma-
nentizing of the eschaton; it is a kind of
millennialism with a strong belief in the
ability of humans to build the kingdom of
God on their own.47 This millennialism is
arguably inherent already in modernity’s
essential myth of unending progress, the
most consistent attempt of a realization
of which so far is represented by the mod -
ern totalitarianisms of Nazism and Com -
mu nism. In transhumanism, however,
this myth resurfaces with unprecedented
clarity.
My analysis of transhumanist thought
has shown that transhumanism is incon-
sistent in its use of basic ideas concepts
like truth and human equality. Truth is a
central idea even for transhumanist epis-
temology; if not true in the traditional
sense of the word, transhumanism is
reduced to the irrelevance of an arbitrary
perspective. However, any notion of truth
that takes its universal and transcultural
aspects seriously is incompatible with the
transhumanist insistence on anthropocen-
tric empiricism as the only viable point of
orientation. One cannot uphold a consis-
tent notion of universal truth with refe-
rence to the (infinitely changing) human
subject alone. In the same way, the idea of
human equality, to which even transhu-
manists pay lip-service, is incompatible
with the transhumanist emphasis on the
un limited malleability of the human; there
is, according to transhumanism, nothing
essentially human on which a doctrine of
human equality could possibly be foun-
ded. The transhumanist understanding of
truth and equality thus appears as instan-
tiations of its immanentizing of the escha-
ton; in both cases, concepts of an essenti-
264 Transhumanism, Truth and Equality
Theofilos  vol. 7 nr. 3 2015
265
Theofilos  vol. 7 nr. 3 2015
ally transcendent or metaphysical charac-
ter are referred to without any reflection
on what occurs when their traditional
metaphysical framework no longer
applies. 
Transhumanists present themselves as
adhering to an ideology that is rational in
the sense of being free of internal incon-
sistencies and contradictions. We must
con clude, however, that this is not the
case. Far from being free from inner con-
tradictions, transhumanism is full of
them. And these inconsistencies are not
related to the peripheral and uninteres-
ting; on the contrary, they are built into
the basic tenets of the ideology to the
extent that no quick fix seems possible.
Our expectations of how far technology
can and should continue in improving
our life conditions should therefore be
guided by entirely different and presu-
mably less contradictory principles and
ideologies. As a starting point, it might
then be a good idea to simply take con-
cepts like truth and equality seriously
with all their metaphysical implications
and try to figure out what this might
entail. What happens when we don’t, we
learn by studying transhumanism.
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